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Tem sido sublinhado pelo mundo dos negócios que a qualidade da 
auditoria e o governo das sociedades podem desempenhar funções 
críticas em vários escândalos empresariais. Compreender a importância 
das relações entre a eficácia do governo das sociedades e a qualidade da 
auditoria requer investigar os respetivos componentes. O presente estudo 
visa, portanto, apresentar uma revisão abrangente e sintetizar de forma 
comparativa os resultados dos estudos publicados sobre a eficácia dos 
mecanismos do governo das sociedades, assim como dos fatores que 
influenciam a comissão de auditoria, com vista a determinar os prováveis 
efeitos na qualidade da auditoria. 
Embora diversos fatores que influenciam a qualidade da auditoria e as 
especificações do auditor tivessem sido identificados como suscetíveis de 
afetar significativamente a qualidade da auditoria, a dimensão da 
empresa de auditoria foi identificada como o fator de maior influência. 
Acresce que tanto o conselho de administração como as especificações 
da comissão de auditoria foram identificados como fatores críticos 
influenciadores da eficácia do governo das sociedades, a qual, por seu 
turno, interage com a qualidade de auditoria. De tudo isto decorre que as 
alterações na eficácia do governo das sociedades devem ser consideradas 
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It has been highlighted by the business world that audit quality and 
corporate governance can play critical roles in various corporate 
scandals. Understanding how the relationships between effective 
corporate governance and audit quality is important, requires 
investigating their components more precisely. So, the present study aims 
to carry out a comprehensive review and comparative summarizing the 
results of the published works on the effectiveness of corporate 
governance mechanisms, as well as audit committee’s influencing 
factors, in order to investigate their probable effects on audit quality.  
In this regard, despite audit quality influencing factors and auditor 
specifications were found to be able to affect the audit quality 
significantly, audit firm size has been identified as the most important 
factor affecting audit quality. Moreover, both board of directors and audit 
committees specifications were identified as critical influencing factors 
in the effectiveness of corporate governance which interacts with audit 
quality. As a consequence, changes in effectiveness of the corporate 
governance should be considered as an important factor, when assessing 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Backgrounds and motivation 
Key references have indicated that audit quality and corporate governance can play critical 
roles in various corporate scandals. Audit quality factors have been identified to be critical 
because of their effects on the audit quality. In this regard, in majority of the studies, the 
well-known audit quality factors such as size, industry expertise, auditor tenure, audit fees, 
non-audit services and auditor reputation, auditor specifications such as independence, 
liability and competence have been  discussed (see e.g., Bauwhede & Willekens, 2004; 
DeAngelo, 1981a, 1981b; Eshleman & Guo, 2014; Francis, 2004; Hussein & Hanefah, 
2013; Schmidt, 2012; Thornton, 2003). 
Among the wide range of the indentified factors, size can be considered as the most 
effective indicator of audit quality (Francis & Yu, 2009; Lennox, 1999). Consequently, 
higher audit quality can be easier achieved by the larger audit firms (Francis, 2004), 
because of their ability to discover and report the misstatements (DeAngelo, 1981b). But, 
reaching high audit quality in small size audit firms is also attainable, since they conform 
with audit standards (Bauwhede & Willekens, 2004; Larn & Chang, 1994).  
However, due to the existence of the auditors’ related specifications such as professional 
competence, technical ability, auditor’s liability, and auditor independence, it is more 
expected to reach higher audit quality in large audit firms (Hussein & Hanefah, 2013). 
More technical abilities and industry knowledge can be raised from the audit expertise. So, 
demanding for audit expertise leads to higher audit quality (Craswell, Francis, & Talylor, 
1995), and thereby, enhances auditor’s reputation.  
In addition, audit tenure may affect audit quality, positively or negatively. Negative effects 
may be resulted from a close connection between the auditor and the client which can lead to 
fraud by ignoring the material misstatements included in financial statements (Firth, Rui, & 
Wu, 2012), while the positive effects can be achieved through the utilization of the clients 
financial statement knowledge (Dye, 1991). On the other hand, both audit fees and non-audit 
services may affect the audit quality, since higher audit quality requires additional procedures 
resulting in higher audit fees (DeFond, Raghunandan, & Subramanyam, 2002). 





Audit quality influencing factors can be utilized to evaluate effectiveness of each 
individual factor, while one of them is investigated as a proxy of audit quality. For 
instance, audit fees can be considered with other factors while its fluctuation affects the 
audit quality (Rustam, Rashid, & Zaman, 2013). Thus, the importance of such factors have 
led to many calls for improvement of the audit quality in recent years (see e.g., Cahan, 
Godfrey, Hamilton, & Jeter, 2008; Eshleman & Guo, 2014; Laux & Newman, 2010; 
Schmidt, 2012). 
Corporate governance can be helpful to resolve agency problems through regular system 
via monitoring and controlling the managers, in order to reach shareholders objectives 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; M. Jensen, 2001). Corporate governance provides a structure 
by which the objectives of the firms are arranged, and the means for achieving those goals 
and control performance are determined (OECD, 2004). So, corporate governance is the 
mechanism by which companies are directed and controlled (Cadbury, 1992).  
Considering the shareholders’ wealth and firms’ performance, corporate governance needs 
to implement an effective structure. Board of directors is established in corporate 
governance structure to act regarding the shareholders expectation. The board of directors 
includes executive and non-executive directors which are elected by shareholders. They 
should judge independently to reach the headlines of the strategy, performance, resources, 
including key appointments, and standard of conduct (Hirshleifcr & Thakor, 1994).  
The board of directors, as a central element of corporate governance, plays an important 
role in the firm. In this regard, effectiveness of the board of directors should be improved 
regarding the firm’s objectives. Thus, such improvement may occur through considering 
board of directors’ influencing factors. In this case, board of directors influencing factors, 
such as size, independence, expertise and, meetings have been investigated in some studies 
to improve board of directors’ effectiveness and, thereby, enhance effectiveness of 
corporate governance (see e.g., Alzoubi & Selamat, 2012; Dahya & McConnell, 2005; Hsu 
& Wu, 2013; Jensen, 1993). 
The board of directors have been established in corporate governance structure to fulfill 
shareholders objectives. Audit committee has been implemented as a financial committee 
of the board of directors to act in line with the firm’s financial objectives. Previous studies 
have argued about two main tasks which can be adequately performed by effective audit 





committees (see e.g., Cadberry, 1992; Dezoort, Hermanson, Archambeault, & Reed, 2002; 
Gendron, Be´dard, & Gosselin, 2004; Lin, Xiao, & Tang, 2008; Menon & Deahl Williams, 
1994). Such audit committee's main tasks are to overview the financial process and the 
auditor’s activities. 
Considering the main tasks of the audit committee, several influencing factors (such as 
size, independence, expertise, authority and, meeting) can play critical roles in the 
effectiveness of audit committees (see e.g., Dezoort et al., 2002; Mohiuddin & Karbhari, 
2010; Walker, 2004). Such influential factors have the potential to enhance the audit 
committee's performance, especially in financial reporting integrity, as well as monitoring 
functions (Alzoubi & Selamat, 2012; Be´dard, Chtourou, & Courteau, 2004; Beasley, 
1996; Xie, Davidson, & DaDalt, 2003). Hence, audit committee’s influencing factors can 
affect the audit quality, since higher effectiveness of audit committees leads to higher audit 
quality (Goodwin-Stewart & Kent, 2006).   
1.2 Research objectives and questions 
The main objective of the present thesis is the study of the corporate governance 
effectiveness with special emphasis on audit quality as well as its influencing factors and 
understanding the effects of corporate governance. Because of its critical impact on the 
audit quality, decision makers need to assess the corporate governance effectiveness. In 
this regard, the main objectives of this study were attained by answering the following 
specific questions (SQ): 
SQ1- What are the influencing factors of audit quality? And what are the identifiable 
roles of the corporate governance on the overall audit quality? 
SQ2- Can corporate governance components play a significant role in the audit quality?  
SQ3- Is there any relationship between corporate governance and audit quality? 
1.3 Work description 
SQ1 the first step was carried out to attain the answers of the mentioned questions, based on 
the main objective of this thesis. In this regard, it has been tend to review and summarize the 





scientific literature related to the audit quality factors and the general roles of corporate 
governance on the overall audit quality. 
Answer to SQ2 is attained by categorization and interpretation of the theoretical and 
empirical results obtained from the literature review of the specific roles of corporate 
governance components such as board of directors. The study focuses on the corporate 
board of directors and audit committee. In this regard, audit committee and its influencing 
factors are reviwed in order to reach their effects on the audit quality. 
SQ3 is achieved by the interpretation of identified results from SQ2. In effect, the last step 
is investigating the effect of the corporate governance mechanisms on the audit quality in 
order to find the existing relationships between the mentioned elements. Consequently, the 
influence of the corporate governance effectiveness on the audit quality is reached through 
the identified results. 
1.4 Thesis structure 
Second chapter of this thesis presents an overview of the audit quality and its influencing 
factors. In the mentioned chapter, audit quality influencing factors as well as its 
specifications are briefly reviewed.  
Chapter 3 presents the significant roles of agency theory and the necessity of the audit 
quality and corporate governance in resolving agency problems. In addition, it presents the 
comprehensive review of the corporate governance mechanisms as well as its components. 
Also, the board of directors’ effectiveness as well as its influencing factors are reviewed. 
Moreover, influencing factors of the audit committee effectiveness are comparatively 
investigated.  
Finally,  in the last chapter, the effect of audit committee and audit quality factors on the 
audit fees have been considered as subjects for further discussion to magnify the probable 
interaction of corporate governance with audit quality. It is expected that the results arising 
from this thesis provide a brief improvement of both audit quality and corporate 
governance mechanisms. 





Chapter 2: Audit quality and its influencing factors 
2.1 Audit quality 
2.1.1 Terms and definitions 
Auditors intend to issue an opinion, providing a reasonable assurance on the fairness and 
credibility of financial statement, detecting the material misstatements. So, audit quality 
has been defined as the likelihood to discover and report material misstatements by 
auditor’s technical capabilities, as stated by DeAngelo, (1981). In this circumstances 
auditor’s independence is also crucial when reporting the discovered errors.  
Discovering and reporting material errors depends on different factors related to auditors 
competencies. Training and experience qualifies the auditor to discover material 
misstatements. Moreover, independence would be the condition to report what has been 
discovered (Colbert & Murray, 1995). 
In addition to the auditor’s independence, other individual specifications such as 
professional competence, specialized knowledge, liability and expertise are important 
factors influencing the quality of auditor professional judgment and, hence, audit quality. 
As the audit process increases the informational value of the accounts, auditor’s report can 
affect the use of accounts. In order to guarantee the auditor’s independent opinion, it is 
needed for auditors to enhance their professional judgment independency (Craswell, 
Stokes, & Laughton, 2002). In other words, in order to maintain the auditor’s 
independency, auditors are obliged to improve their professional judgment and, thereby, to 
increase the ability of providing information value for users (Arrunada, 2000; Thornton, 
2003). 
Both actual quality and perceived quality have been argued as important issues in audit 
quality definition. Actual audit quality can be considered as the probability of reducing the 
risk of reporting a material misstatement in the financial statement (Palmrose, 1988). 
Perceived quality is the belief of financial statement users about auditor’s ability to reduce 
the material misstatements. In this situation, greater perceived audit quality can result in 
investment process improvement in audited clients. It can be stated that audit quality 





represents how the auditing process can detect and report material misstatements of the 
financial statements in terms of reaching reasonable assurance (DeAngelo, 1981b). The 
belief of users about audit quality results from auditor’s individual specifications. Such 
high audit quality should be associated with high information quality of the financial 
statements (Balsam, Krishnan, & Yang, 2003). The main reason for this is that financial 
statements audited by high quality auditors should be less likely to contain material 
misstatements. In this case, audit quality is achieved not only by discovering misstatements 
but also through the client who introduces adequate adjustments.  
Considering client’s perspective, reaching higher quality in auditing process and report can 
be stated as one important purpose. Due to the wealth function of the firm, shareholders are 
more interested in getting high quality audit reports, whereby preferred higher quality 
audit. Stakeholders are also concerned about audit quality. Accordingly, lack of the audit 
quality may decrease the probability of discovering an audit failure (Bauwhede & 
Willekens, 2004). In addition, the factors that have been studied in the present manuscript 
influence audit quality directly or indirectly. Such factors make audit quality more 
important to be studied.  
2.1.2 Audit quality influencing factors 
The importance of factors which influence audit quality has been argued in many studies. 
As stated before, such factors can affect the audit quality directly or indirectly which are 
individually consistent with some audit quality proxies. Meanwhile, this thesis aims to 
present a clearer attitude on the classification of the audit quality factors that may influence 
audit quality. 
2.1.2.1 Size 
The link between the request for audit services and audits to large-firms is based on the 
“agency theory” as well as the links between audit quality and the auditor size (Lindberg, 
2001). Therefore, clients intend to choose a high quality auditor to reach the best auditing 
results. So, they are more interested in demanding for large audit firms with higher 
reputation compared with small audit firms. The higher reputation, the higher incentive to 
issue clean and accurate audit report, because inaccurate audit reports can lead to decline 





the reputation. The decline of reputation could result in attracting less clients and in the 
decrease of audit fees. Large auditors with higher credible clients can suffer noticeable 
losses compared with small auditors if they issue inaccurate reports. Therefore, the large 
audit firms have more incentive to issue a reliable audit report with the purpose of 
maintaining their reputation (DeAngelo, 1981b).  
Some factors such as professional competence, auditor’s qualification and supporting 
technical information undoubtedly can be found in large audit firm’s system. Such factors 
can be taken into consideration when assessing the influence of audit firm’s size on audit 
quality to facilitate the detection of the possible errors (Hussein & Hanefah, 2013). 
Because of the higher degree of specialization of large audit firm’s employees, the 
technological knowledge of audit groups in large firms would be higher than in small 
auditors. In other words, continuing professional education is more considerable in large 
audit firms than in small ones (O’Keefe & Westort, 1992).  
Larger audit firms support higher quality audits (Francis, 2004). Also, the utilization of 
high quality auditors reveals that large entities (client) prefer to choose a high level of audit 
quality with higher technical knowledge. So, when the firm becomes larger, a higher audit 
quality will be demanded with the purpose of enhancing the monitoring and bonding 
activities. Also, adopting such strategies will be beneficial to the client, despite some 
inevitable operating costs (Hay & Davis, 2004). 
Several studies have investigated the relationship between audit quality and auditor size 
(e.g., Francis & Yu, 2009; Hay & Davis, 2004). Most of them confirmed that the large size 
auditors are positively correlated with audit quality (e.g., Colbert & Murray, 1995; 
DeAngelo, 1981; O’Keefe & Westort, 1992). On the other hand, some other surveys have 
mentioned that there is no difference between large audit firms and smalls one in terms of 
their impact on audit quality, both of them have the potential to reach an acceptable level 
audit quality (e.g., Bauwhede & Willekens, 2004; Jackson, Moldrich, & Roebuck, 2008; 
Larn & Chang, 1994).  
However, it seems that larger audit firms are more qualified and committed to reach a 
higher audit quality. It can be attributed to their high technical information and 
professional competencies as well as their attempt to continue higher education of 
employees and to maintain firm’s reputation on issuing an appropriate audit report. Such 





activities are necessary in order to keep their clients. In Fig. 2.1 the relationship between 
audit quality factors and audit size is illustrated.  
 
Fig. 2.1 The observed relationships between audit quality factors and size. 
Note:1, 2: Not relationship has been observed between size and both audit tenure and non-audit fee. 3: (a) The larger 
audit firm size may reach the higher reputation in order to issuing more reliable and accurate audit report. (b) The 
larger audit firm with the higher reputation may demand for more audit fee (6). 4: (a) The large audit firm may earn 
more audit fee due to operate with higher quality of monitoring and bonding. (b) The large audit firm may demand 
higher audit fee in order to higher level of audit expertise (7).(c) In terms of brand name, the larger audit firm may 
capture more audit fee. 5: The larger audit firm may operate with higher level of auditor specialization. 
2.1.2.2 Industry expertise 
According to literature, it is clear that the expertise of the auditor plays an important role in 
improving audit quality. Demanding auditor specialization in an industry leads to a higher 
level of technical competence and technical information. It is mainly due to auditor’s 
potential ability to detect financial statement errors (Arrunada, 2000). In this case, industry 
expertise knowledge enhances the likelihood that auditors discover errors and, thereby, 
affect the probability of reporting the discovered errors (Hammersley, 2006). Requesting 
industry expertise can represent an incentive for audit firm to invest in expertise and to 
desire industry-based customers.  
Besides, the industries which normally use the expertise contract, accounting related 
technologies, are more powerful to reach a higher level of audit quality by utilizing 
industry expert auditors than non-expert auditors (Craswell et al., 1995). So, audit quality 
is positively related to specialization and industry expertise (Lowensohn, Johnson, Elder, 
& Davies, 2007).  
In addition, audit tenure is directly related to the industry expertise, because a new 
industrial audit client may desire to benefit from audit expertise, technical ability and 
knowledge. So, auditors will be able to fulfill the lack of client-specific knowledge during 





the first years of audit tenure (Stanley & Todd DeZoort, 2007). In this regard, higher audit 
fee increases as audit expertise enhances. This is mainly due to the fact that higher audit 
expertise can lead to higher audit quality (Francis, 2004). In other words, additional 
investment on expertise can cause a positive effect on the audit fee premium (Craswell et 
al., 1995).  
Hence, industry expertise is positively associated with audit fee and audit quality (Cahan et 
al., 2008). In this situation, industry expertise might reach more premium compared to 
non-industry expertise (Wang, O, & Iqbal, 2009). In addition, industry expertise, 
reinforced by auditors during the engagements, will lead to higher audit quality (Hussein & 
Hanefah, 2013). Such experiences can also enhance the audit reputation through market 
credibility.  
In summary, industry expertise advantages together with general audit knowledge, can 
enhance the audit technical ability and audit reputation and so increase audit quality as well 
as leading to a higher level of audit fees. 
2.1.2.3 Auditor tenure 
Audit tenure has been investigated as short and large audit tenures. In this regard, studies 
have mentioned that the shorter the auditor’s tenure, the less auditor client knowledge. As a 
result, lower audit quality is expected. In contrast, longer audit tenure can lead to decrease 
auditor’s professional care, and therefore reducing audit quality.  
On the other hand, with larger audit tenure it is more likely to discover misstatements using 
technical abilities and higher levels of knowledge. But the relationship between auditor and 
client may reduce independence and can reduce the probability of report misstatements. 
So, short audit tenure may involve the auditors with the risk of less technical knowledge 
and abilities. Therefore, the audit report quality can also be affected by audit tenure.  
Generally, auditors have more incentive to issue a clean or acceptable audit report in the 
first years of their engagements. In terms of client’s perspective, maintaining auditor for 
next period can depend on the issuing of a clean audit report. Therefore, if auditors know 
that clients are considering to switch them, it can influence the type of audit report 
(Vanstraelen, 2000). Then, such reactions can adversely affect auditor’s independence, and 
thereby, reduce audit quality.  





In fact, in the first years of the connection between auditor and client, audit failures are 
generally higher and rise the audit costs due to the need of additional procedures by the 
new auditor (Barbara, Richard, & Kurt, 2006). The auditor’s mandatory rotation may cause 
some additional actions due to the loss of industry expertise and necessary information 
about financial report in the first years, which may enhance the likelihood of the audit 
failure (Gavious, 2007), as well as the additional costs to support the new auditor with the 
information about client’s normal and special functions (Chi, Huang, Liao, &Xie, 2009). 
Such additional costs, negatively affect the relationships between the mandatory audit-firm 
rotation and audit quality (Chi et al., 2009). So, if there is no mandatory rotation, auditors 
are more likely to preserve longer tenures by satisfying clients.  
The idea that long term audit tenure may lead to lower audit quality has been confirmed by 
previous studies (Adenuyi&Mieseigha, 2013; Chen, Lin, & Lin, 2008; Gul, Fung, &Jaggi, 
2009; Gul, Jaggi, & Krishnan, 2007; Johnson, Khurana, & Reynolds, 2002). Also, long 
term relationships between auditors and clients may cause the familiarity between auditors 
and management. This can lead to reduce auditor’s independence and audit quality as well 
(Carey &Simnett, 2006).  
Therefore, as stated by legislators and business press, mandatory auditor rotation has been 
recommended, in order to increase the auditor’s independence and to prevent fraud on 
issuing report (Barbara et al., 2006). Such negative relationships between auditor tenure 
and audit quality have been widely investigated, for instance by Carey &Simnett, 2006; 
Choi &Doogar, 2005. 
In order to influence audit opinions, managers may switch auditors if they issue a qualified 
opinion. This represent an incentive for the auditor to issue an inadequate report. However, 
managers may not tend to switch auditors after receiving a qualified report. In fact, 
managers are willing, in several circumstances to receive a high quality audit report. In a 
situation of quasi-rent audit fees, managers will receive more satisfying reports from 
incumbent auditors compared to their switching by a new auditor (Jackson et al., 2008). In 
other words, long term relationships between auditors and clients may increase the 
incentive for the auditor to issue an unqualified reports (Vanstraelen, 2000).  
Rotation initially can lead to lower audit quality due to the need to compensate the lack of 
client auditor knowledge (Francis, 2004). However, incumbent auditors may not report 





discovered misstatements. In this case, they are cheating by issuing a clean report which 
result from lower auditor independence and audit quality (DeAngelo, 1981b).  
Furthermore, some relationships can be observed between audit tenure and financial 
reports quality, when restating or modifying the financial statements and then the audit 
report. Restating financial statement after rotation means that the initial financial report 
was consistent with the misstatement(s) and fraud(s). Accordingly, the new audit report 
(after restatement of financial statements) makes visible the low quality of the previous 
audit(Stanley & Todd DeZoort, 2007).  
Thus, mandatory auditor rotation will increase the likelihood of financial statement 
restatement compared to non-rotation firms (Firth et al., 2012). Therefore, there is an 
inverse relationship between the audit long tenure and the restatement financial report 
(Stanley & Todd DeZoort, 2007). 
In conclusion, long term relationships between auditors and client may reduce auditor’s 
independence, and thereby, decrease the audit quality. On the other hand, mandatory 
auditor rotations can lead to additional costs due to the need for additional procedures by 
new auditors. So, this gives the incentive for restating financial reports to capture 
unqualified audit opinion. In this situation, auditor’s impairment of independence and 
lower audit quality of the initial audits is notorious.  
2.1.2.4 Audit fee  
Audit fee as an important factor of audit quality has been used in several studies, 
specifically in examining the link between audit quality and the size (e.g., DeAngelo, 
1981; Francis, 2004; Hay & Davis, 2004). Greater audit fees are also associated with the 
choice of qualified auditors (Hay & Davis, 2004). In spite of higher audit fee, some clients 
are more interested in using large audit firms. Clients are confident that large audit firms 
have greater monitoring and bonding in order to capture higher audit quality (Hay & 
Davis, 2004).  
In terms of the auditor competence and specialization, including technical information and 
continuing education, large audit firms hire better professionals in comparison to small size 
firms. So, the larger the audit firm the higher auditor’s specialization (and audit quality) is 
expected and therefore higher audit fees is achieved (DeAngelo, 1981b). For instance, as 





the demand for higher audit quality as well as additional activities are increased, higher 
audit fee is expected for company (Houghton & Jubb, 1999).  
On the other hand, the reputation of audit firms can be negatively influenced by high-risk 
clients, and so, because of such influences, undoubtedly higher audit fee is charged by 
larger audit firms (Hogan, 1997). However, no relationship may be identified in cases of 
doubts regarding going concern between audit fees and “going concern opinion” (DeFond 
et al., 2002), and the “demanding for audit quality” (Lindberg, 2001).  
Maintaining the reputation, auditors wish to perform an acceptable audit work. In 
summary, higher audit fee may result in greater audit quality (Eshleman & Guo, 2014) 
through increasing audit efforts as well as the utilization of higher qualified auditors. In 
terms of brand name, larger audit firms may demand higher audit fees (Basioudis & Fifi, 
2004). In contrary, since large audit firms are willing to preserve their reputation they do 
not have incentive to receive higher fees or fee premium as a condition to conduct high 
audit quality work. 
2.1.2.5 Non-audit service 
Non-audit services as well as the audit service can affect the audit quality (Jeong, Jung, & 
Lee, 2005). To be more precise, auditing cost fluctuations can result from the changes in 
both audit fee and non-audit services (Ding & Jia, 2012). It has been argued by Houghton 
& Jubb (1999) that non-audit services fee is less price-sensitive compared to the audit fee 
and can play an important role to enhance the audit firm partners’ wealth.  
However, it is expected a positive relationship between qualified audit reports and both 
audit quality and non-audit fee (Houghton & Jubb, 1999). The regulators and AICPA have 
strongly highlighted the independence of the auditor. In addition to the economic theory 
about the auditor’s independence, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules 
express that contrary to the actual audit, perceived auditor independence is a function of a 
non-audit fee ratio (Schmidt, 2012). The temptation to earn more non-audit fee could 
impair the auditor’s independence (Frankel, Johnson, & Nelson, 2002). 
In terms of quasi-rent, a higher probability of maintaining quality in both auditing and non-
audit services substantially results from continuous contracts. In this case,compliance with 
obligations is not logic. However, it is highly related to the internal incentives of the 





involving parties, especially those which are the cause of the reputation acquisition. The 
implicit contracts mechanisms is thus beneficial to the parts (Arrunada, 2000). It can be 
considered as one of the quasi-rent benefits, resulting from costs reduction. This is 
explained by the difference between the wages paid for the current use of productive 
resource and their maximum best alternative applications (Chow, 1982). To enhance the 
effectiveness of the implicit contracting, the auditor must ensure to obtain a stream of 
quasi-rents, which maintains his incentive to present an acceptable performance (Arrunada, 
2000). 
In general, investors are not concerned about loss of auditor’s independence who are 
auditing large clients in comparison to auditing small clients (Ghosh, Kallapur, & Moon, 
2009). This is mainly due to the fact that auditors receive incentives to be specifically 
considered about the loss of reputation which results from independence impairment in 
their audits for large clients. Moreover, the auditors are less economically dependent on 
small clients. Thus, since non-audit services result usually from large clients, high levels of 
non-audit services can decrease the auditor independence and may also affect the audit 
quality (Francis, 2004). 
2.1.2.6 Auditor reputation 
In common, large audit firms have more reputation than smaller ones. So, the reputation 
cost in the smaller firms is considerably less than in the larger audit firms (Hogan, 1997). 
Hence, larger firms not only have incentives to maintain their existing level of reputation, 
but also they wish to enhance it by presenting accurate audit report. This is mainly due to 
the potential effect of audit quality on auditor reputation.  
Reputation can serve as a proxy in examining the relationship between audit quality and both audit 
size and audit fees. Based on “capital theory”, due to more credibility of larger auditors, audit firms 
with great reputation are considered to be more accurate (Teoh & Wong, 1993). It means that the 
large auditors, having more reputation, are more likely to issue accurate audit report (Lennox, 
1999). This theory also reveals that more credible audit firms can demand higher audit fees, 
because of the market value of their audit reports (Lindberg, 2001). However, such higher audit 
fees, may lead to decrease auditor’s independence (DeFond et al., 2002), because higher audit fees 
can represent clients intention to get a clear audit report.  





Thereby, auditors may lose their independence and so their reputation. So, a negative effect 
between auditor reputation and audit fees can occur (Tomczyk, 1996). As a result, the 
auditor reputation as well as the audit fee can be influenced. Table 2.1 summarises the 
results arising from theoretical and empirical studies about the audit quality factors. 
Table 2.1 Summary of the audit quality factors based on the results of previous theoretical and empirical 
studies. 
Factor Observed Relationship 
Positive Negative No-effect 
Size (Colbert & Murray, 1995; 
DeAngelo, 1981b; 
Francis, 2004; O’Keefe & 
Westort, 1992) 
Not Observed (Bauwhede & Willekens, 
2004; Jackson et al., 2008; 
Jeong & Rho, 2004; Larn 




Lowensohn et al., 2007) 
Not Observed Not Observed 
Auditor 
Tenure 
(Chi et al., 2009) (Carey & Simnett, 2006; Chen et 
al., 2008; Choi & Doogar, 2005; 
Gul et al., 2009; Gul et al., 2007; 
Johnson et al., 2002) 
Not Observed 
Audit Fee (Eshleman & Guo, 2014) Not Observed (Lindberg, 2001) 
Non-Audit 
Service 
(Houghton & Jubb, 1999) Not Observed (Francis, 2004) 
Auditor 
Reputation 
(S. H. Teoh & Wong, 1993) Not Observed Not Observed 
 
2.1.3 Auditors specifications 
2.1.3.1 Independence 
Auditor’s independence is the capacity of auditor to act, in mind and in appearance, 
objectively without influences. Non-audit service as an audit quality factor can have a 





considerable impact on auditor’s independence, and regulators have been deeply concerned 
about that. So, independent auditing can be considered as a fundamental specification in 
any active capital markets. In this regard, most of regulators have stated that non-audit 
services can lead auditors to lose their independence in order to capture larger non-audit 
service (Chen, Elder, & Liu, 2005; Gul et al., 2007; Thornton & Shaub, 2014).  
As stated by Simunic (1984), auditor engagements as management consultants can 
compromise auditors independence. However, being worried about reputation loss as well 
as litigation costs can maintain auditors independent (DeFond et al., 2002).  
Concerning non-audit services, SEC 2000 has mentioned two situations about auditor’s 
independence: first, the probability that auditors become financially dependent of clients as 
a result of non-audit services. Such dependence can ensure the auditors to keep their 
engagement. Secondly, the consulting nature of many non-audit services may lead auditors 
to act against the audit process, as a result of the managerial roles.  
As a conclusion, auditor’s independence can be considered as a specification which is 
strongly associated with audit quality factors and, thereby, auditor’s independence may 
strongly influence audit quality.  
2.1.3.2 Liability 
The impact of liability on audit quality has been investigated by various studies (e.g., 
Acemoglu & Gietzmann, 1997; Dye, 1993; Fargher, Taylor, & Simon, 2001; Free, 1999; 
Mlumad & Thoman, 1990; Narayanan, 1994). In common, audit firms have liability for 
their actions considering their accountability to the regulators (Chung, Farrar, Puri, & 
Thorne, 2010). For some reasons, the auditors may be pressured by such conditions to be 
serious and accurate in their functions.  
Risk of litigation and litigation costs resulting from perceived audit failures (real or not 
real) are usually associated with auditor’s liability. In this regard, litigation costs may arise 
from sources such as clients, investors and other financial statement users. Such costs may 
cause liability payments and loss of reputation. Moreover, litigation risk can put auditors 
under pressure to accept a client.  





In addition, litigation risks can create an incentive for auditors to be more diligent on their 
duties. So, the auditors are responsible to issue satisfying answers to the economic players 
and stakeholders (Free, 1999). Because of the financial statement importance for market, 
logically higher degree of auditor liability is expected by the investors. Thereby, such 
expectations may lead to take more considerations into account, when auditors are at risk 
of liability payment. Then, considerable liability payment can be an insurance for investor 
to prevent possible audit failures (Schwartz, 1997).  
Therefore, litigation risk can cause high audit quality. In this regard, audit costs will be 
increased due to the necessity of more skills and higher efficiency to achieve high levels of 
audit quality, which may result in significant drop of litigation costs. Thus, litigation costs 
can affect both higher audit quality and higher audit cost, directly or indirectly (Narayanan, 
1994). 
Considering size, more liability is expected from the large audit firms, by clients and 
investors. Such liabilities normally lead large audit firms to reduce litigation risks, which 
may be resulted from the audit failure (Ding & Jia, 2012). In other words, larger audit 
firms with higher liability potentially have more litigation risks and costs that may lead to 
higher considerations on audit services and, thereby, increase audit quality (DeFond, 2012; 
Lennox & Li, 2012).  
Regarding auditor’s new engagement and client acceptance, some reasons may lead 
auditors to reject high risk clients in order to prevent litigation risks and costs. First of all 
there is the risk that auditors can be litigated from investors after an audit failure. 
Secondly, legal liability payments from auditors to investors, which arise from investor’s 
complaint, can be considered in this regard.  
Eventually, extra litigation costs such as attorney fees and, more important, loss of 
reputation can force the auditor to reject a high risk client (Laux & Newman, 2010). Such 
client acceptances may also impair the perceived auditor independence, causing the 
demanding of higher audit fees (Schneider, 2011).  
Therefore, the decision of accepting a high risk client can affect audit quality. This is 
mainly because of high litigation risks and costs, particularly when audit firm is becoming 
larger. So, it may lead larger audit firms to be more precise in selecting and accepting 
clients, in order to reduce litigation risk (Kaplan & Williams, 2012).  





However, both less and more liability may put audit firm partners at risk. Less liability 
may lead to auditor’s negative mind about their independence credibility. Moreover, higher 
liability may lead to higher audit costs for partners. Therefore, partners shouldn’t be 
involved in increasing the liability (Acemoglu & Gietzmann, 1997). In conclusion, 
auditor’s liability to investors, clients and market can reduce the litigation risks and costs 
by reducing audit failures and, thereby, increasing audit quality. 
2.1.3.3 Professional competence 
Professional competence, as stated at the first section of audit general standards, plays an 
important role in the audit process. Particularly, it may contain a considerable impact on 
the auditor’s professional judgment as well as on quality. The concept of the professional 
competence covers two substantial aspects of auditors’ competencies. The first aspect is 
the professional competence attainment which is required to benefit from higher education. 
Such merits are improved based on the principles of public accountants, acquired by 
education, training, exams and professional experience. Maintenance professional 
competence can be considered as the second aspect that requires:  
a)  Continuous improvement of the knowledge and skills regarding career changes and 
developments, in particular, the utilization of the programs which execution must 
be ensured. Such career changes and developments include new ideas and 
principles on accounting and auditing standards as well as the related rules and 
regulations.  
b)  Audit services subject to appropriate control systems in conformity with the 
principles and professional standards. In terms of maintaining professional 
competence in addition to such auditors abilities, auditor’s behavior (such as 
professional ethics, being open-minded, keeping an aware perspective, acting as 
self-reliant and being decisive in their professional judgment) should be considered 
in evaluating auditor’s competence. Such aspects need to be taken into 
consideration in audit plan, in order to attain the audit program and objectives and, 
thereby, achieving high audit quality (IAESB, 2006; ISO 19011:2011). 
Table 2.2 summarises the observed relationships between specifications and factors and 
their impacts on audit quality. 










Observed Effect on the Audit Quality 
 Positive Negative 
Independence (Longe) Audit tenure Not Observed (Carey & Simnett, 2006) 
 (Higher) Non-audit fee Not Observed (DeFond et al., 2002; 
Frankel et al., 2002; 
Thornton & Shaub, 2014) 
 (Higher) Reputation (Tomczyk, 1996) Not Observed 
Liability (Loss of) Reputation Not Observed (DeFond et al., 2002) 
 (The larger audit firm 
the higher liability) 
Size 
(DeFond, 2012; Ding & Jia, 
2012; Kaplan & Williams, 
2012; Lennox & Li, 2012) 
Not Observed 
Competence Size (Hussein & Hanefah, 2013) Not Observed 
 Industry Expertise (Arrunada, 2000) Not Observed 





Chapter 3: Corporate governance mechanisms 
3.1 Agency theory 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), when an individual (principal) engages another 
individual (agent) to perform a specific service on his behalf, conflicts of interest naturally 
arise. In fact, a feature of the relationship is the delegation of some decision-making 
authority to the agent, leading to actions taken by agents in their self-interest.  
Moreover, if the principal wants to follow the agent’s performance, additional costs, 
known by agency costs, may result (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In this regard, “positive 
accounting theory” is involved in order to be reached a minimum level of agency costs.  
In addition, the conflicts resulting from different reactions and behaviors on risk tolerance 
from the principals and the agent are expected and company’s survival may be at risk 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). So, the main problem is that both principal and agent may indicate 
different action versus different levels of  risk. 
3.1.1 Audit role in the agency theory 
Agency theory is an important economic theory, which has relevant effects on audit 
improvements. There are several mechanisms that help to enhance the confidence of 
stakeholders:  
1- Reward package as an effective mechanism creating incentives to agents 
performing their duties;  
2- Statutory mechanism, that can be a written contract,  enforcing the agent to follow 
the purpose of the principal;  
3- Audit as a substantial monitoring mechanism for principal to know whether the 
agent’s functions are trustworthy.  
Audit plays an important role to enhance trust or reliability as well as public and economic 
interest to strengthen accountability on financial reporting. Auditing helps to resolve 
conflicts between the principal and agent, in terms of information asymmetries (Healy & 





Palepu, 2001). For example, the statutory auditors can play a crucial role because they act 
independently.  
According to the International Accounting Standard (IAS), statutory auditors provide an 
independent opinion to shareholders on the reliability and fairness of financial statement. 
Moreover, auditor independence towards the agent is important for shareholders (principal) 
in order to obtain a higher quality audit (Watts & Zimmerman, 1983). As a result, auditing 
provides an independent control on agent performance and enhances the confidence and 
trust on the information provided by the agent.  
3.1.2 Agency theory problem and corporate governance 
Corporate governance is helpful in order to resolve or reduce the agency problem. 
Corporate governance by regular mechanisms can resolve the agency problem. Such 
mechanism are policies, procedures, rules and laws. These aim to reduce conflicts between 
shareholders (principals) and managers (agents) and, thereby, decrease agency costs, in 
order to attain firm’s goals.  
So, effective corporate governance must be organized by firms to enhance the long term 
shareholder value and control the accountability of managers. Given this, firms which have 
weaker governance to balance the organization face greater agency problems (Core, 
Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999). Therefore, weak corporate governance leads to conflict 
between owner (principal) and management (agent) because manager may act far from the 
firm's goals. Consequently, more control and monitoring is needed to reduce agency costs 
(Jensen, 2001). 
Moreover, agency problems may bring private benefits to firm managers. In this regard, 
survival of the firm may be at risk. Therefore, effective corporate governance should be 
implemented to control managers' activities on behalf of stakeholders interests. So, this can 
be helpful in developing positive behavior between managers and shareholders and, 
thereby, reduce the agency problem of the firm (Khan, 2011). As a result, establishing 
effective corporate governance mechanisms can be helpful to reduce both agency cost and 
agent-principal conflicts in firms. Figure 3.1 illustrate agency problems and relationships 
between agency problems and both corporate governance and audit quality. 





Fig.3.1 Agency problems and its relationships with corporate governance and audit. 
 
3.2 Corporate governance effective structure 
3.2.1 Corporate governance definition 
Several definitions of corporate governance have been presented according to different 
points of view. Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled (Cadbury, 1992). Corporate governance provides the structure through which 
the objectives of the firm are arranged, and the means of achieving those aims and control 
performance are determined (OECD, 2004). In fact, corporate governance is pointed to 
enhance shareholders value by monitoring managers and overall firm’s performance. Such 
monitoring is helpful to enhance the accountability of managers and, thereby, decrease 
shareholders-managers problems (agency costs). 
In the case of monitoring process, the board of directors, as the primary responsible for 
corporate governance, is nominated to control the managers and the overall performance of 
the firm, in line with the implementation of the applicable regulations, fulfillment the 
firm’s goals and satisfaction of stakeholders (Shil, 2008). So, corporate governance is 
implemented to represent effective relationships between a firm’s management, its board 
and shareholders. Moreover, it involves to set beneficial system, principle and process to 
govern a firm, in order to fulfill shareholders goals and objectives as well as stakeholders 
assurance in firm’s performance for the long term (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013).  
3.2.2 Corporate governance parties 
Corporate governance parties are based on separation of ownerhsip matter. Parties 
involved in corporate governance include the regulatory body (the Chief Executive Officer 





(CEO), the board of directors, management, audit committee, and shareholders) and other 
interested stakeholders including suppliers, employees, creditors, customers and the 
community, as a while. All parties of corporate governance have an interest, whether direct 
or indirect, in the effectiveness of firm performance. Directors and management benefit 
from salaries and reputation, while shareholders have their own capital and will try to 
maintain it. All these parties should be as effective as to maintain and enhance firms’ 
value. Figure 3.2 shows the ownership separation and corporate governance components. 
Fig.3.2 Ownership separation and corporate governance components. 
 
3.2.2.1 Shareholders 
Shareholder is an organisation or a person who owns shares in a company. So, shareholders as an 
owner desire to increase their wealth as well as saving the reputation of company in view of 
stakeholders. In this regards, they play a critical role to govern the company. A crucial 
shareholder’s role in governance is to nominate directors and auditors to ensure that governance 
structure is appropriately implemented. Shareholders are accountable to elect board members in a 
manner which simplifies their goals achievement and interest (Cadbury, 1992).  
3.2.2.2 Board of directors 
The board of directors plays a key role in corporate governance. It is their accountability to 
support the organisation's strategy, develop directional policies and procedures, appoint, 





supervise and remunerate senior executives and ensure accountability of the organisation 
towards its shareholders (Aguilera, 2005).  
In general, board’s functions consist of laws, regulations and shareholder’s decisions. The 
board of directors are responsible for the governing of company’s strategy, and are 
accountable to act and answer to shareholders. They provide information with quality to 
shareholders.  
So, every organisation should utilize an effective board to lead and monitor the business. 
considering shareholders wealth, the board should regularly control company and monitor 
executive management (Cadbury, 1992). Therefore, balance of power and authority should 
be ensured via division of responsibilities to prevent inappropriate individual decisions.  
The board of directors may be elected based on particular responsibilities by executive and 
non-executive directors. Non-executive directors are independent of company. They 
should judge independently towards executive directors and their own interests, in order to 
reach the strategy and high performance levels. Non-executive directors may lose their 
independence in judgment after several years of engagement in company.  
Thus, in order to be maintained the independent judgment of non-executive directors they 
should be periodically changed. Executive director/chief executive officer (CEO) 1  and 
chairman play important roles in the monitoring of the directors. The CEO normally is 
hired to implement high level of strategy and control management actions in order to 
achieve an overall growth of the company.  
However, the chairman plays the important role of supporting good corporate governance 
in company. In fact, the chairman should act to ensure shareholders about company’s 
affairs are controlled by board, and any obligation of board to the shareholders are fulfilled 
(Cadbury, 1992). Chairman and chief executive should be in separate task. In some small 
company chairman is also chief executive. In this situation, getting strong and independent 
members of the board is essential. 
                                                          
1. The diference between executive director and CEO is that executive director manages non-profit organization while 
CEO runs for-profit organization. Both executive director and CEO are hired by board of directors for acting the same duties. 
Such duties are controlling overall management and company, manage the company’s budget and decision on company’s 
sterategy in purpose to fulfill expected profit of the company and shareholders value.  





3.2.2.3 Role of the auditor 
The effectiveness of internal control system should be assessed by directors, and their 
statement should be reported  as a guidance for the use of auditor (Cadbury, 1992). The 
auditor can be ensured through managements statement about the business going concern. 
In this regard, the effectiveness of audit process may increase and, thereby, enhance audit 
quality. Thus, the auditor should ask an adequate report from directors in order to present 
higher audit quality. In summary, since the audits are reassurance to all who have financial 
interest in firms, auditors’ role is crucial for shareholders to attain their objective. 
Consequently, higher quality audit report can enhance the reputation of the firm from 
stakeholder’s point of view. Figure 3.3 presents the financial reporting process which will 
be performed by external auditor, board of director and audit committee (Soltani, 2007, 
p.83). 
Fig. 3.3 Financial Reporting Process  
 
After the preparation of the financial statements by management, the independent 
auditor should verify them in order to issue an opinion about the financial statements 
and firm’s internal control effectiveness. Audit committee by overseeing independence 
auditor’s performance, attept to enhance the reliability of the financial reports for users. 
Board of directors should state about the internal control effectiveness as well as 
approving and processing financial report in their annual report. All these parties have 
played important roles in financial reporting process in order to enhance the confidence 
of financial reporting users.  





3.2.2.4 Principles of corporate governance 
Although Sarbanes–Oxley Act has defined some roles of corporate governance 
specially board of directors’ accountability in listed company of U.S. stock 
exchanges, OECD principles of corporate governance have been considered in this 
study. 
The principles of corporate governance have been determined as a framework for 
every party having the role to improve corporate governance. The principles provide 
a guidance for investors, stock exchange markets, corporations and other parties in 
both financial and non-financial companies as well as non-traded companies. The 
OECD principles of corporate governance are summarized in six main principles 
which have been explained as follows (OECD, 2004).  
1) Ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance framework  
The framework goals are the promotion of transparent and efficient markets, which 
demands rules of law and responsibility. Such responsibility should be clearly 
articulated in order to obtain the public interest insurance. Supervisory, regulatory 
and enforcement authorities should attain their duties in a professional and objective 
method through authorities, integrity and resources. Also, adequate information and 
rules of corporate governance should be timely and transparently disclosed. 
2) The rights of shareholders and ownerships functions  
The framework should protect shareholder’s rights which include both minority and 
foreign shareholders as well as the contractual rights with the resource providers.  
3) The equitable Treatment of shareholders  
Fair treatment of minority and foreign shareholders should be ensured through corporate 
governance framework. The opportunity to receive effective redress for violation of the 
shareholders rights should be considered. 
4) The role of shareholders in corporate governance 
In order to undertake economically optimal levels of investment in firm-specific human 
and physical capital, corporate governance should find ways to encourage the various 





stakeholders in the firm. Therefore, the governance framework should recognize that the 
interests of the corporation are served by recognizing the interests of stakeholders and their 
contribution to the long-term success of the corporation. 
5) Disclosure and transparency 
The framework should ensure that timely and adequate disclosure is made on all material 
matters regarding the corporation, including the financial situation, performance, ownership 
and governance of the company. 
6) The responsibility of the board 
Roles and responsibility of the board should be clarified in corporate governance framework. 
Also, ensure that control and monitoring of managers as well as shareholder’s interest are 
taken into consideration by the board of directors. 
3.2.3 Corporate governance and board effectiveness 
The monitoring and control roles are important duties of the board of directors. Since there are 
some difficulties in control and monitoring functions by shareholders, the board of directors is 
appointed as representative of the shareholders to fulfill monitoring functions. So, an effective 
board is helpful in monitoring functions to reach shareholder’s goals. Due to this approach, 
board effectiveness in its monitoring function should be determined by some factors. Such 
factors are independence, size, expertise and meeting of the board. In order to enhance the 
effectiveness of the board of directors as a central element of the corporate governance 
mechanism, literature has been studying the effects of the outside directorship on shareholders 
wealth (see e.g., Hirshleifcr & Thakor, 1994; Warther, 1998). Accordingly, the board of 
directors independence, size and composition can be improved by electing outside members.  
3.2.4 Board effectiveness 
The board of directors has been identified as being an important part of the corporate 
governance mechanisms, which can resolve manager-shareholder agency problems (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983). Moreover, board members are responsible in monitoring function to enhance 
firm’s value. Thus, for corporate governance purposes, it is crucial to establish an effective 
board as well as to establish its specifications, which influence its effectiveness. In this regard, 





literature has been reviewed to identify the influencing factors of board effectiveness, as shown 
in table 3.1. 
Table 3.1  Summary of the influencing factors on board of directors based on the results of previous 
theoretical and empirical studies. 
Factor Effect Reference 




More efficient monitoring by using more independent 
directors (outside director) than internal directors.  
(Alzoubi & Selamat, 





The greater the level of ownership by large outside 
shareholders, the more likely the firm is to nominate an 
outside CEO. 
(Park & Rozeff, 1996) 
Size The smaller size of directors in the board the greater 
monitoring is expected in terms of independence. 
(Jensen, 1993; Linck, 
Netter, & Yang, 2008; 
Lipton & Lorsch, 1992) 
Expertise Hiring more expertise in board of directors enhance 
effectiveness of board in advising and monitoring function. 
(Alzoubi & Selamat, 
2012) 
Meeting Frequency of meeting enhances board of directors 
effectiveness considering their monitoring functions. 
(Carcello, Hermanson, 
Neal, & Riley Jr., 2002; 
Krishnan & 
Visvanathan, 2009) 
The issue of corporate governance is how to reinforce the accountability of the board of 
directors to shareholders. Therefore, implementing an effective board of directors is 
necessary for shareholders to maintain firm’s value. In this regard, directors should state 
via report the effectiveness of the internal control system about the business going concern. 
Besides, the auditors should report the effectiveness of internal control systems.   
3.2.4.1 Effects of the board of directors on audit quality 
Shareholders concern on agency problems has been dealt through board of directors in corporate 
governance structure. Board of directors plays critical roles, since it is responsible to oversees the 





firm’s manager and maintain shareholders wealth. In terms of effective board of directors and 
adequate relationships between independent auditors and managers, an audit committee is 
established to enhance the quality of the audits as well as management’s financial report and, 
thereby, maximize shareholders wealth.  
The audit committee is identified as crucial to reach effective independent assurance and guide 
chief executive/board of director on firm’s functions. It has been stated that the firms with both 
independent effective board and audit committee enhance the reliability of financial reports as 
well as firm’s value and improve the ability to attain shareholders interest (Carcello et al., 2002). 
Consequently, it is necessary to point independent audit committee members, which is made up 
of outside directors (Imhoff, 2003).  
Association between corporate governance mechanism and audit quality has been studied in 
several literature works (see e.g., Hay, Knechel, & Wong, 2006; Hay, Knechel, & Ling, 2008; 
Knechel & Willekens, 2006; Lin & Liu, 2009). The positive association between high audit 
quality and high quality governance structures have been approved by most studies. The 
importance of this issue requires being more precise on the corporate governance influence 
factors as well as their association with other specifications. In this regard, such factors have been 
analysed in this study in order to find their impact on corporate governance structures. 
3.2.5 Influencing factors of the “corporate board of directors” 
In the rest of corporate governance structure, there are some factors which affect its 
mechanism and activity. Size, independence, expertise, and activity (meeting) of the board 
of directors  have been stated as common measures of corporate governance. Investigating 
all these factors is helpful to improve the understanding on the relationships between 
firm’s performance and corporate governance. 
3.2.5.1 Board size 
The board of directors roles in the corporate governance of modern firms are crucial to 
take into consideration its influencing factors. Hence, understanding board size has 
been identified as helpful and an effective factor in decision making. Both small and 
large size boards have been discussed in literature, but the majority of studies has 





highlighted the effectiveness of small size board of directors (e.g., Jensen, 1993; Lipton 
& Lorsch, 1992).  
In terms of communication and coordination problems, larger board of directors may 
lead to more loss than small size ones, thereby, the effectiveness of the board as well as 
firm performance can be declined, as stated by  Jensen (1993) and Lipton & Lorsch 
(1992). Also, there can be differences between small and large firm’s board structure. 
When firms are smaller, independence of boards may be increased, because of their 
small size (Linck et al., 2008). In terms of independence, small boards have a greater 
proportion of independent directors which can result in increasing the monitoring 
functions (Alzoubi & Selamat, 2012).  
Moreover, the impact of board size on firm value as well as both firm performance and 
monitoring has been argued in some literature (e.g., Boone, Casares Field, Karpoff, & 
Raheja, 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989; Yermack, 1996). Consequently, the majority of studies 
has argued the negative relationships between board size and corporate governance as 
well as firm value (Mak & Kusnadi, 2005). Consistent with this, Lipton & Lorsch 
(1992) suggested that effective board size shouldn’t be greater than eight or nine 
directors. This is due to director’s remuneration which leads to more costs for larger 
board. Such costs have direct impact on firm’s value (Mak & Kusnadi, 2005).  
In addition, board in situation of ideal size may vary with firm size (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Such example is complex firms, which demand for greater advisory, have larger boards 
including more directors (Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2008).  
3.2.5.2 Board independence and outside members 
Board composition should include independent directors in order to better monitoring 
managers and maintaining firm’s value. Non-executive directors are recognized to be 
nominated as independent corporate-board directors. Such directors are helpful to reduce 
agency problems through their monitoring and control functions as well as specific oversee 
of firm’s management in day-to-day (Brennan & McDermott, 2004; Cadbury, 1992; Fama 
& Jensen, 1983; Fama, 1980). Therefore, independent directors enhance the effectiveness 
of monitoring function as well as reliability of financial statements. Such reliability may be 





enhanced with greater portions of independent directors on board and, thereby, prevent the 
presentation of deceptive financial statements (Beasley, 1996).  
Moreover, electing board members from outside directors is associated with higher 
independence, and thus effectiveness of the corporate governance (Board of directors) can 
be improved. Both inside and outside directors are pointed in purpose of monitoring and 
advisory functions. Considering the firms’ performance, firms with larger gray non-
executive directors on the board are less likely to fail their functions (Hsu & Wu, 2013). 
This situation may influence the performance of the family firms. So, gray directors in 
such firms may have positive impact on performance (Arosa, Iturralde, & Maseda, 2010).  
However, due to the board of directors’ effectiveness, outside members are able to present 
a greater advisory function compared with inside directors. In terms of the firm valuation, 
positive effect of outside directors proportion have been widely investigated, for instance 
by Alzoubi & Selamat, (2012) and Kim & Lim, (2010). Also, they argued about 
nominating outside directors with diversity of academic major or age, which positively 
affect the firm’s value. Therefore, academic major as well as independence performance of 
the outside members on board are the director’s specifications, which may influence firm’s 
value. 
Turnover of the CEO is a factor which may influence board of director’s independence. 
Thus, CEO turnover can be one of the influencing measure of the board effectiveness that 
helps to improve corporate governance structure. Hermalin & Weisbach (1988) have 
argued that mandating turnover of CEO on board can increase board effectiveness. Also, 
they have investigated the different views of inside and outside directors on CEO rotation. 
Inside directors do not desire to remove CEO if their interests are tied to CEO. Outside 
directors compared with inside directors may have reputational incentive to rotate an 
ineffective CEO.  
In fact, outside directors, in order to maintain their reputation, are not likely to impair their 
independence. So, board with outside directors may make better decision than boards with 
only inside directors. In this case, outside directors have more influence on board decision 
(Dahya & McConnell, 2005). Moreover, CEO turnover not only may help to maintain 
director’s independence, but also is helpful in monitoring function as well as performing 
advising roles (Kim, Mauldin, & Patro, 2014). 





3.2.5.3 Board financial expertise 
Expertise is an important specification of a director which affects the board of directors’ 
effectiveness. Considering a good corporate governance structure, board of directors need 
expertise and experience besides other specifications of directors, to make better decision 
on firm performance as well as monitoring functions. Thus, expertise of directors may be 
crucial when directors should rely on their own decision making as well as their 
monitoring function. Also, necessity of expertise in business result in enhancing the 
effectiveness and efficiency of advising role of outside directors in firms (Kim & Lim, 
2010). 
Financial expert director is a type of director in board that particularly affects the corporate 
financial decision. Such expertise results from  director’s experience as well as accounting 
and finance knowledge. Due to size factor, small board size with larger independent 
director as well as more financial expertise are more effective in their monitoring process 
(Alzoubi & Selamat, 2012). So, if board of directors include greater financial expertise 
members, then high quality audit may be demanded for director’s interests (Carcello et al., 
2002).  
Therefore, higher level of board expertise tracks higher incentive of monitoring function in 
order to enhance firm’s value. In addition, financial expert directors have more incentive to 
lead management to follow high quality accounting policies (Jiang, Ferris, & Coffman, 
2009). In this regard, such expertise is crucial to improve the effectiveness of the board of 
directors in decision making (Defond, Hann, & HU, 2005).  
In summary, financial expertise through monitoring of firms’ performance as well as advisory 
services can improve corporate governance mechanism, and stronger board of directors in such 
mechanism is helpful to enhance shareholders wealth.  
3.2.5.4 Board meetings 
Formal meetings of the board of directors, should be held usually at appropriate times to 
consider policy issues and major problems, such as financial problems. The board of directors 
as a key element of corporate governance, should manage the meetings based on their key 
responsibility which is, among others, monitoring the financial reporting process and 





maintaining overall accordance with shareholders’ interests. In effect, effectiveness of the 
board of directors affects the corporate governance mechanisms and firm’s performance.  
In this regard,  meeting frequency has been identified as helpful in improving the board of 
directors’ effectiveness (see e.g., Carcello et al., 2002; Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2009). Vafeas 
(1999) indicated that frequency of board meeting is negatively related to firm’s value. This is 
due to increasing the frequency of board meeting leads to share price decline. In fact, if 
benefits of increasing board meeting frequency are over emphasized, board meeting frequency 
will be negatively related with firm value. Finally, he concluded that board activity which is 
measured by meeting frequency is an important matter on board of directors’ operation. 
Krishnan & Visvanathan (2009) have argued that higher board of directors’ meeting is 
positively related to audit fees, which is due to additional works leading to higher audit quality. 
Moreover, meeting frequency is an important dimension of board functions, especially in 
preventing the fraud (Chen, Firth, Gao, & Rui, 2006). Therefore, frequency of the board of 
directors is positively associated with fraud occurrence. 
Recently, Chou, Chung, & Yin (2013) have argued about the presence in meeting of directors 
by themselves. They indicated that more effective directors intend to participate in the 
meetings themselves, not by their representatives. In addition, they concluded that firm’s 
performance may be enhanced through high number of meetings of directors by themselves. 
On the contrary, high number of meetings with directors’ representatives may decline firm’s 
performance. In terms of recent regulation improvements, board activity has a positive effect 
on the firm’s value (Brick & Chidambaran, 2010). This may be due to the fact that more 
frequent meeting lead to more monitoring and applying new policies and regulations.  
In summary, board of directors frequency meeting leads to higher monitoring of 
management financial functions as well as ensuring the application of regulations, thereby, 
enhancing the board  effectiveness. Considering the board of directors’ influencing factors, 
its effectiveness influences the corporate governance mechanisms positively or negatively.  
Figure 3.4 shows the effects of  board of directors’ factors on board effectiveness and also 
its effects on corporate governance. 





Fig. 3.4 The observed relationships between board of directors’ factors and bord of directors and its 
interaction with corporate governance. 
3.3 Audit Committee  
Maintaining accounting records and obtaining assurance on their accuracy and adequacy 
requires internal control and monitoring activities. Such control should be applied through 
cooperation between the board of directors and financial management. In fact, the board of 
directors should have implicit control over financial management function. Eventually, at 
the end of each period, board of directors should state the effectiveness of internal control 
as well as firm’s going concern, via a report to the auditors. By adopting this approach, 
audit committee has been considered as a financial operating committee which cooperate 
with the board of directors, to be accountable on financial reporting process (Cadbury, 
1992). Then, audit committee statements together with board’s annual report are 
considered during decision making process.  
3.3.1 Audit committee responsibility 
The primary responsibilities of the audit committee in cooperation with board of directors 
can be verifying: 
- “The integrity of the company’s financial statements;  
- The independence, integrity, qualification and performance of the external auditors; 





- The performance of the company’s internal audit function; 
- The appropriateness of internal control systems of corporation; 
- The monitoring of compliance with laws and regulatory requirements and code of 
conduct (Soltani, 2007, p.95).”  
Audit committees play key roles in corporate governance. They perform their duties via the 
framework of governance rules. Their responsibility to perform the identified practice by 
the board should be done in line with implemented framework. The responsibilities and 
duties of the audit committee, is promoted by corporate governance, based on the firms’ 
objectives and shareholders wealth. Also, importance of the financial function in 
organizations necessitates the audit committee accountability in order to answer the legal 
interests of the stakeholders (Dezoort et al., 2002). 
3.3.2 Audit committee effectiveness 
Audit committee is linked to (but not dependent of) the board of directors.Thus, 
fluctuations in its effectiveness may affect the board of directors’ effectiveness regarding 
financial statements. In this regard, the structure of audit committee, as well as its 
specifications should be taken into consideration in order to enhance its effectiveness. 
Several studies have investigated the influencing factors on the effectiveness of audit 
committee (see e.g., Dezoort et al., 2002; Mohiuddin & Karbhari, 2010; Walker, 2004). In 
this regard audit committee composition, authority, resources and diligence have been 
identified as the most important factors.  
Audit committee meeting as well as its composition, including independence, size and 
expertise, have been found as critical specifications which may influence audit committee 
effectiveness (Alzoubi & Selamat, 2012; Mohiuddin & Karbhari, 2010). Audit committees 
should have adequate authority to perform their duties as well. Their authority is associated 
with rules and regulations and board of directors which may influence the audit committee 
performance and, thereby, enhance their effectiveness (Dezoort et al., 2002). 
Kamel & Elkhatib (2013) indicated that the review of changes in the accounting policies 
and practices, is an important function of an effective audit committee. In addition, the 
authority of committee acts as a consultant due to its oversight responsibility, as well as its 
accounting and financial knowledge (financial expertise), can improve the committee’s 





effectiveness (Salleh & Stewart, 2012). In this study, considering the importance of audit 
committee, its influencing factors have been reviewed in order to find their relationships 
with the audit committee effectiveness. 
3.3.3 Audit committee factors 
3.3.3.1 Audit committee size 
When the audit committee varies in its size, there are consequences on its effectiveness and 
good performance. In terms of monitoring functions, large audit committees may decrease  
performance because of coordination and communication problems in committee (Jensen, 
1993). Contrary to this approach, large audit committees may present higher quality of 
their performance due to more committee members (Yang & Krishnan, 2005).  
Moreover, small size audit committees might have less ability (because of less members) 
to accomplish their duties, such as monitor the overall financial operations as well as its 
other duties. In other words, inappropriate number of members may impair the 
effectiveness of audit committee functions (Vafeas, 2005).  
Raghunandan & Rama (2007) concluded that increasing the number of audit committee 
members may provide more effective monitoring. In this regard, several studies have 
suggested that establishment of an appropriate size of audit committee can enhance its 
performance and its effectiveness (see e.g., Carcello & Neal, 2000; Davidson, Xie, & Xu, 
2004; Raghunandan, Rama, & Read, 2001; Vafeas, 2005; Xie, Davidson, & DaDalt, 2003). 
So, audit committee size can affect audit committee effectiveness, particularly in financial 
reporting integrity and monitoring functions. In this regard, positive relationship between 
audit committee size and financial reporting quality is expected.  
3.3.3.2 Audit committee independence 
Audit committee should play a critical role in financial process. Audit committees should 
be in cooperation with auditors and management and should review and monitor the 
financial reporting process.  
Considering the cooperation with auditor, monitoring of both audit and non-audit fee by 
independent audit committee is necessary to help auditors to maintain their independence. 





Therefore, there may be a positive relationship between independent audit committee and 
audit independence (Beattie, Brandt, & Fearnley, 1999).  
So, audit committee should be independent of the firm and its management, to perform 
with higher effectiveness to accomplish shareholder’s interests and firms value. Moreover, 
higher quality of financial reporting process is expected if more independent members are 
included in audit committees (Be´dard et al., 2004).   
In addition, there is a negative association between the independence of the board of 
directors and financial fraud (Beasley, 1996). It is also clear that more independent 
members in audit committee can be beneficial to enhance audit committee effectiveness, 
reducing financial fraudulent activities and improving firm’s value 
Considering the management and auditor communications, audit committee with 
independent members establishes effective treatment to prevent management interference 
in audit process. In fact, audit committee is a link between auditors and management 
activities (Goodwin-Stewart & Kent, 2006).  
Since audit committees effectiveness affect both auditors and management behaviors 
(Fearnley & Beattie, 2004), their independence can influence the reviewing of non-audit 
services as well as auditor’s activities. Such approaches can be reliable, if members are 
truly independent and committed to fulfill their duties in order to improve the effective 
governance (Sori, Mohamad, & Karbhari, 2009).  
Moreover, Bronson, Carcello, Hollingsworth, & Neal (2009) have argued about the 
adequate amount of independence is needed for audit committee. They have suggested that 
the advantages of audit committee independence are attainable when the audit committee is 
completely independent.  
In summary, independence of audit committee has been identified as an important factor 
which can have a significant positive relationship with audit committee effectiveness.  
3.3.3.3 Audit committee expertise 
The expertise of audit committee plays an important role in improving its effectiveness (e.g., 
Beasley, 1996; Defond, Hann, & HU, 2005; DeZoort & Salterio, 2001). Audit committees 
with expert members, who have special knowledge and experiences in their task, are at higher 





levels of their performance. This is mainly due to their potential abilities in performing their 
duties. Therefore, expertise in audit committees is critical. This is mainly due to the fact that 
audit committee’s main duties are monitoring corporate financial reporting as well as the 
auditing process (Lin et al., 2008).  
So, effective audit committees with expert members may enhance both technical information 
and competence of financial parties in firms. This helps to resolve some difficulties which arise 
from accounting and financial functions. Such difficulties are due to the possible conflicts 
between management and external auditors in making decision about some complex 
accounting issues. Since there are such conflicts, audit committees with expertise members are 
able to resolve the complexity of issues with their technical knowledge and experiences 
(Knapp, 1987). So, committee members with financial knowledge can positively enhance audit 
committees effectiveness (Dellaportas, Leung, & Cooper, 2012; DeZoort & Salterio, 2001). 
This is due to their abilities to ensure a high quality financial reporting process, and to comply 
with the implemented rules. 
Effectiveness of audit committees with financial expertise may improve corporate governance 
effectiveness, through enhancing the shareholder’s value. Consistent with this, Defond et al. 
(2005) have argued about the interaction between strong corporate governance and financial 
expertise in firms. Finally, they found positive interaction of this association, which can 
support the need of accounting financial expertise in corporate governance. In addition, 
corporate governance effectiveness can be improved by audit committees financial 
expertise.  
According to Abbott & Parker (2000) audit committees without industry experts have annually 
two meetings are more likely to use expert auditors. So, industry expertise can be considered 
an important factor of auditor selection which can potentially influence the audit committee 
functions. In summary, expertise is an important influencing factor of audit committee that plays 
a critical role in audit committee effectiveness and functions. 
3.3.3.4 Audit committee meeting 
Previous studies have aimed to attain an optimal frequency for audit committee meetings in order 
to improve the audit committees effectiveness (see e.g., Abbott, Parker, Peters, & Rama, 2007; 
Sharma, Naiker, & Lee, 2009; Song & Windram, 2004; Yin, Gao, Li, & Lv, 2012). Anderson, 





Mansi, & Reeb (2004) noted that audit committee, as an important element of corporate 
governance, can affect the reliability of financial report. In addition, Chen (2008) concluded that 
the number of audit committee meetings is an important mechanism of corporate governance.  
In terms of meeting frequency, a minimum of two meetings has been suggested by Menon & 
Deahl Williams (1994) to guarantee an effective audit committee. On the other hand, Abbott et 
al. (2007) and Sharma et al.(2009) identified that the frequency average of annual meetings of 
audit committee must be at least around four times a year to achieve an effective audit 
committee. In addition, single annual meeting is not adequate to reach an effective audit 
committee control (Deli & Gillan, 2000). Hence, optimal frequency is needed to reach the 
positive effects of audit committee on the firm’s financial matters.  
In this regard, empirical evidences have approved the positive relationship between frequency of 
committee meeting and the quality of a firm’s financial issue (Abbott, Parker, & Peters, 2004).  
Although most of the studies have concluded that an optimal number of meeting frequency 
improve the reporting quality as well as audit committee effectiveness, Ismail, Iskandar, & 
Rahmat (2008) found no influence of meeting frequency on the reporting quality.  
Considering the board of directors monitoring, audit committees with more frequent annual 
meeting are expected to fulfill their oversight responsibility (Xie et al., 2003). In other words, 
more effective monitoring functions may occur as a result of higher frequency of audit 
committee meetings (Alzoubi & Selamat, 2012).  
However, Yin et al. (2012) found a negative association between the number of audit committee 
meetings and the proportion of independent members in a board of directors. Also, they stated 
that there is a positive relationship between frequency of meeting and both audit committee 
and firm size.  
In terms of audit process, more frequency of committee meetings may lead to higher audit fees. 
This is mainly due to the higher audit quality that may be demanded as a result of more 
committee meetings (Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2009). In this regard, demanding for higher audit 
quality requires additional work as well as utilizing related procedures by external auditors and, 
thereby, increase audit fee (Houghton & Jubb, 1999). So, the more frequency of committee 
meetings the higher audit quality as well as higher audit fees is expected. Table 3.2 illustrates the 
effects of the influencing factors on the audit committee based on the results of previous 
theoretical and empirical studies. 





Table 3.2 Summary of the influencing factors on the audit committee effectiveness based on the results of 
previous theoretical and empirical studies. 
Factor Effect Reference 
Size Large audit committees may present higher quality 
performance.  
(Yang & Krishnan, 
2005) 
 Large audit committees may present lower quality 
performance due to board’s communication problems. 
(Jensen, 1993) 
Independence The more independent audit committee members the higher 
quality financial processes are expected. 
(Be´dard et al., 2004) 
 The more independent audit committee members the less 
financial fraud may occur.  
(Beasley, 1996; Kamel 
& Elkhatib, 2013) 
 Independence of the audit committee members is positively 
associated with external auditors’ independence. 
(Beattie et al., 1999) 
Expertise Audit committee with relevant industry knowledge leads to 
higher quality financial reporting process in terms of 
monitoring functions. 
(Dellaportas et al., 
2012; Lin et al., 2008) 
 Higher committee’s technical knowledge can help to solve 
auditor-management conflicts in complex accounting issues. 
(Knapp, 1987) 
Meeting Audit committee meeting frequency is positively associated 
with the quality of financial reporting process. 
(Abbott et al., 2004) 
 More frequency of committee meeting can enhance the audit 
committee effectiveness in monitoring functions. 
(Alzoubi & Selamat, 
2012; Xie et al., 2003) 
 The negative association between audit committee meeting 
frequency and director members’ independence may occur. 
(Yin et al., 2012) 
 Both audit committee and firm’s size are positively 
influenced by meeting frequency. 
(Yin et al., 2012) 
 
  





3.3.4 Effect of audit committee and audit quality measures on the audit 
fees 
3.3.4.1 Effect of audit committee measures on Audi fees 
The purpose of maintaining shareholder’s interest leads to improve corporate governance 
mechanisms. By performing audit committee’s main tasks, higher transparency of financial 
report as well as higher audit quality may be captured to ensure shareholders wealth. Audit 
committees determinants have been widely studied in order to improve audit committees 
main tasks, such as financial reporting process and monitoring the relationships between a 
firm’s management and its external auditors.  
In addition, audit committees can play an important role in reviewing the external auditors 
outputs as well as the audit fees (Cadbury, 1992). So, implementing an effective audit 
committee may lead to decrease the audit fees, due to its monitoring functions (Be´dard et 
al., 2004).  
Moreover, Goodwin-Stewart & Kent (2006) considered that effective internal control is 
also an important element to reduce audit fees. Because the external auditor’s work is 
reviewed by audit committee higher audit quality is expected. Higher expectation of audit 
quality leads to fluctuations of audit fees. In this regard, determinants of audit committee 
(such as size, independence, expertise and, meeting) have been stated as proxies of audit 
fees in the literature. 
In terms of audit committee size, positive relationship between audit fees and committee 
size is expected. In fact, larger audit committees may elect higher quality external audit in 
order to achieve higher financial reporting quality, thereby leads to higher audit fees 
resulting from auditor’s additional work. In other words, since higher audit quality is 
expected (by using larger audit committees) from external auditor, the auditors should 
spend more time to fulfill their duties, which lead to higher audit fees (Kalbers & Fogarty, 
1993).  
Corporate governance with more independent audit committee members demand higher 
quality for financial reporting from auditor, when monitoring the firm’s financial reporting. 
Therefore, such demands from external auditor may lead to higher audit fees. So, there is a 





positive relationship between independent committee members and audit fees (Abbott, 
Parker, Peters, & Raghunandan, 2003; Rustam et al., 2013; Yatim, Kent, & Clarkson, 
2006).  
Moreover, Griffin, Lont, & Sun (2008) have predicted both negative and positive relationships 
between audit committees and audit fees. They have concluded that effective corporate 
governance with more independent audit committee members normally pay higher audit fees 
(positive relations). In addition, audit committee independence may interact negatively with 
audit risk which leads to decrease the audit fees (negative relations). So, independence of audit 
committee members affects the audit fees positively or negatively. 
Audit committee expertise is an important factor which can affect audit fees. The effective 
audit committee attempts to include experts, who are likely to enhance financial reporting 
quality, through appropriate behavior in communication with auditors.  
Therefore, audit committees with less financial expertise and auditing knowledge may not be 
able to support external auditors, adequately. Such miss-supporting may lead to additional 
work for external auditors which may increase audit fees (DeZoort & Salterio, 2001).  
However, although positive association between audit committee expertise and audit fees hasn’t 
been found by Rustam et al. (2013), positive relationship has been concluded in literature (see 
e.g., Abbott et al., 2003; Yatim et al., 2006). Frequency of audit committee meetings can enhance 
the review of financial reporting process as well as external auditors. This may lead to enhance 
the audit committee’s expectation for higher audit quality. In terms of meeting frequency, 
external auditor are more concerned to reach higher audit quality which requires additional 
procedures and, thereby, increases audit fees (Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2009).  
In addition, presence of external auditor at audit committee meetings (which is usual or 
even mandatory in some countries)  and their accountability duties may increase auditor’s 
time that leads to higher audit fees (Rustam et al., 2013).  
On the contrary, Abbott et al. (2003) mentioned that meeting frequency is not associated 
with higher audit fees. As a result, most studies have stated a positive relationship between 
meeting frequency and audit fees (e.g., Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2009; Rustam et al., 
2013; Yatim et al., 2006). Table 3.3 illustrates the relationships between influencing 
factors of audit committee and audit fees, based on the results of previous theoretical and 
empirical studies. 





Table 3.3 Summary of the discovered association between influencing factors on audit committee and audit 
fees based on the results of previous theoretical and empirical studies. 
Factor Effect Reference 
Size Audit committee size is positively associated with audit 
fees, since auditors normally spend more time due to their 
additional work. 
(Kalbers & Fogarty, 
1993) 
Independence  
There is a positive relationship between independent 
committee members and audit fees, resulting from higher 
expectation of such committee to auditor work. 
(Abbott et al., 2003; 
Griffin et al., 2008; 
Rustam et al., 2013) 
 Considering the negative association between audit 
committee independence and audit risk, lower audit fees is 
expected. 
(Griffin et al., 2008) 
Expertise The less expertise in audit committee can lead to miss-
supporting of the auditor, and, hence higher audit fees may 
be demanded due to the needs of auditor’s additional work. 
(Negative relation) 
(DeZoort & Salterio, 
2001) 
 There is a positive relationship between audit committee 
expertise and audit fees in terms of more monitoring of 
auditors’ work.  
(Abbott et al., 2003) 
Meeting The more frequency of meetings the more financial report 
reviewing and the higher expectation from external auditor, 
which leads to higher audit fees (positive relation). 
(Abbott et al., 2003; 
Krishnan & 
Visvanathan, 2009; 
Rustam et al., 2013; 
Yatim et al., 2006) 
 
3.3.4.2 Effect of audit quality measures on audit fees 
According to International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB), audit 
quality is an important issue. In order to prevent new corporate scandals, influencing 
factors of audit quality (such as size, audit tenure, expertise, audit fees, non-audit services, 
audit reputation, auditor independence and liability) have been widely studied in both 
theoretical and empirical studies (DeAngelo, 1981b; DeFond et al., 2002; DeFond, 2012; 





Francis, 2004; F. A. Gul et al., 2007; Lennox & Li, 2012; Palmrose, 1988; Teoh & Lim, 
1996). Such factors, not only have been identified as audit quality determinants, but also 
have been investigated in correlation with each other when one of them is considered as a 
proxy of audit quality. For instance, audit fees can be considered by auditor’s 
independence, audit firm size, liability, expertise and auditor reputation, as its fluctuations 
affect the audit quality. In this regard, the impact of audit fees on audit quality influencing 
factors have been reviewed in this study, in order to analyse its effects on audit quality. 
Both audit and non-audit fees have been identified as possibly increasing, since higher 
audit quality may need additional works (DeFond et al., 2002). It can also happen that at 
the first year of audit that the auditor attempts to fulfill the lack of client’s knowledge by 
using expertise (Stanley & Todd DeZoort, 2007). Thus, enhancing audit expertise can lead 
to higher audit quality (Francis, 2004) and, thereby, to demand the higher audit fees. So, 
there is a positive relationship between audit fees and audit quality, if the effect of audit 
expertise is considered (Cahan et al., 2008; Craswell et al., 1995).  
Larger audit firms are more likely to maintain their clients, since they are more reputable 
compared with small audit firms. In fact, they are attempted to issue reliable audit report to 
enhance audit quality. Thus, larger audit firms may demand for higher audit fees due to 
their reputation (DeAngelo, 1981b). In addition, as the large audit firms are more precise in 
bonding and monitoring functions, client may demand large audit firms to attain higher 
audit quality. In this regards, higher audit fees is expected by the larger audit firms (Hay & 
Davis, 2004). 
Moreover, high risk client may influence the audit firms reputation negatively, and thus, 
higher audit fees may be charged by larger audit firms (Hogan, 1997; Hussein & Hanefah, 
2013). Auditors are likely to fulfill an acceptable level of their tasks in order to maintain 
their reputation. Given this, higher audit fees may lead to higher audit quality, as a result of 
maintaining the reputation by using higher qualified auditor (Eshleman & Guo, 2014). As a 
consequence of “capital theory” higher reputable audit firms can demand higher audit fees, 
resulting from the market value of their audit reports (Lindberg, 2001).  
However, auditor’s independence may be declined, because of such higher audit fees 
which may lead to enhance client’s incentive to receive a clean report (DeFond et al., 





2002). So, a negative association between audit fees and auditor reputation may occur 
(Tomczyk, 1996). 
Large audit fees received from a client, have been found as an important factor of  audit 
quality which can impair the auditor independence (Teoh & Lim, 1996). Also, auditor 
independence can be impaired, since there is a temptation to earn more non-audit fees 
(Frankel et al., 2002).  
In terms of client acceptance, audit firms are not likely to accept high risk clients, because 
of attorney fees and loss of reputation (Laux & Newman, 2010). Also, acceptance of such 
clients may decline auditor’s independence because of demanding higher audit fees 
(Schneider, 2011). Consequently, higher audit fee is negatively associated with the auditor 
independence, due to the effects of the high risk clients acceptance on audit quality.  
Table 3.4 presents the possible relationships between influencing factors of audit quality 
and audit fees based on the results of previous theoretical and empirical studies. 
Table 3.4 Summary of the association between influencing factors on audit quality and audit fees, based on 
the results of previous theoretical and empirical studies. 
Factor Effect Reference 
Size Larger audit firm may demand for higher audit fees due to 
their higher reputation, higher quality of bonding and 
monitoring functions, and maintaining their reputation 
from accepting high risk client. 
(DeAngelo, 1981b; Hay 
& Davis, 2004; Hogan, 
1997) 
Independence Independence of the auditors may be impaired due to their 
temptation for more audit fees and non-audit fees. 
(Frankel et al., 2002; H. 
Y. Teoh & Lim, 1996) 
 Higher audit fees are negatively associated with auditor 
independence, since high risk client acceptance can affect 
audit quality. 
(Laux & Newman, 
2010; Schneider, 2011) 
Expertise Using more expertise leads to higher audit quality and, 
thereby, increase audit fees. 
(Francis, 2004; Stanley 
& Todd DeZoort, 2007) 
Reputation Maintaining auditor’s reputation leads to both higher audit 
quality and audit fees, since using qualified auditor is 
required to issue more credible audit report. 
(Eshleman & Guo, 
2014; Lindberg, 2001) 
 Negative relationship between higher audit fees and 
reputation may occur because of the client’s incentive to 
receive clean audit report. 
(DeFond et al., 2002) 





Chapter 4: Discussion and conclusion 
4.1 Discussion 
4.1.1 Interaction of corporate governance (considering audit committee) 
with audit quality 
According to the key references, both effective or weak audit committee (important 
component of corporate governance) strongly influence  audit quality. For instance, larger 
audit firms with higher reputation and expertise may use additional work, which lead to 
higher audit fees and, thereby, enhance audit quality.  
However this higher audit quality may not be due to larger audit firms with higher reputation, 
since effective audit committee plays an important role in defining both non-audit and audit fees. 
In this regard, external auditors are likely to issue adequate reports, which leads to maintain 
auditor independence and, thereby, enhance audit quality. This situation may cause doubts in 
auditor acceptance decision, because decision makers are not ensured if the higher audit quality 
results from effective audit committe or is affected by other factors.  
Moreover, weak audit committee may lead to lower audit quality. Since temptation of 
higher non-audit services as well as higher audit fees may impair independence of external 
auditors, lower audit quality may occur. Otherwise, this lower audit quality may be 
resulted from lower monitoring works of audit committees in weak corporate governance 
mechanisms. This can cause uncertainty to the decision makers for auditors acceptance.  
As a result, decision makers need to know, first, if fluctuation of audit quality is a result of both 
performance quality of the corporate governance and other audit quality factors, or just one of 
these elements. Secondly, they should be ascertained on the amount of corporate governance 
effectiveness to analyze audit quality and, then, to decide about auditor acceptance.  
Figure 4.1 shows the association between audit committee and its factors with audit fees 
and the effects of audit quality factors on audit quality when they are considered as 
determinants of audit fees. This figure also shows that audit committee, as component of 
corporate governance, can affect audit  quality assessment positively or negatively.  





Fig. 4.1 The observed relationships between audit quality factors and audit fees and the corporate governance 
interaction. 
 
Note.1-The observed relationships between audit quality factors and audit fees and their interaction with audit quality are 
based on table 3.4. 2-The observed relationships between audit committee factors and audit fees and their interaction with 
audit quality are based on table 3.3. 3-The interactions of corporate governance with audit quality is shown as a result of 
these relationships.  
4.2 Conclusion and further research directions 
4.2.1 Conclusion 
Considering the main purpose of this thesis, a literature review has been conducted. The 
main purpose was to identify corporate governance mechanisms and its effectiveness as 
well as the existing relationship between corporate governance and audit quality through 
both a comprehensive and a comparative review. 
In terms of audit quality importance and its influencing factors, size of audit firm can be 
considered as one of the most important factors which can affect the other factors as well 
as the overall audit quality.  
Furthermore, the reviewed factors, including size, industry expertise, auditor tenure, audit 
fees, non-audit service, auditor reputation and auditor specifications, were found to be 





related with each other when studying the effect of each individual factor on audit quality. 
Also, auditor specifications such as professional competence, technical ability, 
independence and auditor’s liability have been identified to have significant effects on 
audit quality. Consequently, both audit quality influencing factors and specifications 
significantly affect the audit quality changes. 
Corporate governance helps to resolve agency (manager-shareholder) problems and 
effectiveness of corporate governance mechanism enhance shareholders wealth. It has been 
identified that corporate governance structure is important to monitor the management as 
well as firm performance, in order to enhance firm value.  
Composition of the board has been taken into consideration in terms of its specifications. 
Such specifications affect the corporate governance effectiveness and, thereby, enhance 
firm value. Independence of the directors (outside directors) can be considered as one of 
the most important specifications of the board of directors. Since it considers together with 
size and expertise of the board members, effectiveness of the board on both advising and 
monitoring functions as well as firm performance can be taken into account.  
As a result, implementing an effective board of directors through their specifications, not 
only can be helpful on corporate governance mechanisms, but also can be critical in 
advancing firm’s performance to reach the shareholders’ objectives. 
Moreover, this thesis supports the improvement of the corporate governance as well as its 
interactions on the audit quality with the aim of the satisfying market decision makers’ 
needs. It has been covered one of its main objectives through a comparative review of the 
relationship between audit committee effectiveness and audit quality. Also, the fluctuating 
of audit fees, which are affected by audit quality influencing factors, as well as the 
determinants of audit committee effectiveness, have been considered to illustrate the 
interaction of the corporate governance effectiveness on the audit quality.  
Although, the audit committee determinants (such as size, independence, expertise and, 
meeting) were found important in order to enhance its effectiveness, independence of the 
audit committee members can be considered as the most important factor (see table 3.2).  
Further, it was observed that the interactions between the audit fees and the audit quality 
factors can affect the overall audit quality, positively or negatively (see table 3.4). 





Consequently, both size and independence, as the most important factors of the audit 
quality, should be taken into account when they are affected by audit fee.  
According to the achieved results, audit fees fluctuations were found to be associated with 
the audit quality and audit committee. This shows the effect of the interaction of audit 
quality and audit committee factors with audit quality (table 3.3).  
Finally, the interaction of the audit committee, as a corporate governance component, with 
audit quality has been investigated as a crucial issue for decision makers.  
The results show both negative and positive effects of the corporate governance on the 
audit quality (see Fig. 4.1). As a result, considering such relationship, the effectiveness of 
the corporate governance as well as its weaknesses can be taken into account when audit 
quality is analyzed by its factors. 
4.2.2 Further research directions 
It would be necessary to perform efficient and more reliable audit quality assessments in 
order to improve the information quality available to third parties. Hence, further empirical 
studies are suggested to be carried out in order to identify and to quantify the effectiveness 
of the corporate governance and audit quality factors.  
As the next step, four hypotheses (as followings) can be taken into consideration, to 
discover the probable relationships between audit committee’s influencing factors and 
audit fees, by using statistical regression methods.  
Hypothesis 
H1. There is a positive relationship between audit committee independence and audit 
fees. 
H2. There is a positive relationship between audit committee size and audit fees. 
H3. There is a positive relationship between committee meeting frequency and audit 
fees. 
H4. There is a positive relationship between committee member expertise and audit 
fees. 





Based on the achieved results, the effects of  these hypotheses on the audit quality should 
be examined to assess the effect of the corporate governance effectiveness on the audit 
quality assessment.  
Table 4.1 illustrates the proposed dependent and independent variables with the expected 
relationships for further studies. 
Table 4.1 Predicted dependent and independent variables for further studies. 
Variables predicted variables Expected relationship References 
Audit fee Amount of fees paid to 
external auditors. 
Positive (Rustam et al., 2013) 
Committee Size Number of directors serving 
on the audit committee. 
Positive (Menon & Deahl 
Williams, 1994; Rustam 
et al., 2013) 
Committee 
Independence 
Binary variable, =1 if at least 
one insider serves on the 
committee, and 0 otherwise. 
Positive (Abbott et al., 2003, 




Proportion of financial experts 
in committee. 
Positive (Abbott et al., 2003; 
Rustam et al., 2013; 
Yatim et al., 2006) 
Committee 
Meeting 
The number of meetings held 
by the audit committee. 
Positive (Goodwin-Stewart & 
Kent, 2006; Menon & 
Deahl Williams, 1994; 
Rustam et al., 2013) 
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